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DILORDONNANCE DU D W 20 16	Court File No.: CV-16-543763-00CP
LOCAL REGISTRAN SUPERIOR COURT DE JUSTICE COUR SUPÉRIEURE DE JUSTICE ERIC	<i>ONTARIO</i> OR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

JEFF MAILLOUX

Plaintiff

- and -

TAKATA CORPORATION, TK HOLDINGS INC., and NISSAN CANADA INC.

Defendants

Proceeding under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992

AMENDED FRESH AS AMENDED STATEMENT OF CLAIM

TO THE DEFENDANTS

A LEGAL PROCEEDING HAS BEEN COMMENCED AGAINST YOU by the plaintiffs. The claim made against you is set out in the following pages.

IF YOU WISH TO DEFEND THIS PROCEEDING, you or an Ontario lawyer acting for you must prepare a statement of defence in Form 18A prescribed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, serve it on the plaintiffs' lawyer, or where the plaintiffs do not have a lawyer, serve it on the plaintiffs, and file it, with proof of service, in this court office, WITHIN TWENTY DAYS after this statement of claim is served on you, if you are served in Ontario.

If you are served in another province or territory of Canada or in the United States of America, the period for serving and filing your statement of defence is forty days. If you are served outside Canada and the United States of America, the period is sixty days.

Instead of serving and filing a statement of defence, you may serve and file a notice of intent to defend in Form 18B prescribed by the Rules of Civil Procedure. This will entitle you to ten more days within which to serve and file your statement of defence.

IF YOU FAIL TO DEFEND THIS PROCEEDING, JUDGMENT MAY BE GIVEN AGAINST YOU IN YOUR ABSENCE AND WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE TO YOU. IF YOU WISH TO DEFEND THIS PROCEEDING BUT ARE UNABLE TO PAY LEGAL FEES,

LEGAL AID MAY BE AVAILABLE TO YOU BY CONTACTING A LOCAL LEGAL AID OFFICE.

Date:

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Issued by:

March 29, 2016

F. Youssef Registrar

Local Registrar

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Address of Court Office

Toronto Court House

SUPERIOR COURTCOUR SUPÉRIEUREOF JUSTICEDE JUSTICE393 UNIVERSITY AVE.393 AVE. UNIVERBITY10TH FLOOR10E ÉTAGETCRONTO, ONTARIOTORONTO, ONTARIOM5G 1E6M5G 1E6

TO: TAKATA CORPORATION

ARK Hills South Tower 4-5 Roppongi 1-Chome Minato-ku, Tokyo, 106-8488 Japan

AND NISSAN CANADA INC. TO: 5290 Orbitor Dr.

Mississauga Ontario L4W 4Z5 Canada

AND TK HOLDINGS INC.

TO:

601 Abbot Road East Lansing, Michigan 48823 U.S.A.

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DEFINED TERMS

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1. In this Amended Statement of Claim, in addition to the terms that are defined elsewhere herein:

(a) "Airbag Inflator" means a chamber that generates gas to inflate and deploy an airbag in order to protect a vehicle occupant;

(b) **"Body Control Module"** means an electronic control unit responsible for monitoring and controlling various electronic accessories in the vehicle's body, and which communicates with other onboard computers;

(c) "CJA" means the Ontario Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c.C-43, as amended;

(d) "Class" or "Class Members" means all persons in Canada who owned or leased one of the subject Vehicles as of the date of the Recalls;

(e) "CPA" means the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, SO 1992, c.6, as amended;

(f) "Excluded Persons" means the Defendants and their officers, directors and their respective heirs, successors and assigns;

(g) "*Motor Vehicle Safety Act*" means the *Motor Vehicle Safety Act*, SC 1993, c.16, as amended;

(h) "Nissan" means Nissan Canada Inc.;

(i) "NHTSA" means the U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration;

(j) "Plaintiff" means Jeff Mailloux;

(k) "**Recalls**" means Transport Canada Recalls #2013117, issued April 11, 2014, #2014272, issued July 2, 2014, #2014476, issued October 23, 2014, #2014559, issued December 10, 2014, #2014566, issued December 12, 2014, and #2015210, issued May 15, 2015;

(1) **"Takata"** means Takata Corporation, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Japan;

(m) "**TK**" means TK Holdings Inc.;

(n) "Takata Defendants" means collectively, Takata and TK; and

(o) "Vehicles" means those vehicles subject to Transport Canada Recalls #2013117, issued April 11, 2014, #2014272, issued July 2, 2014, #2014476, issued October 23, 2014, #2014559, issued December 10, 2014, #2014566, issued December 12, 2014, and #2015210, issued May 15, 2015, as described in paragraph 3.

The Plaintiff, on his own behalf and on behalf of all Class Members, seeks:

(a) an order certifying this action as a class proceeding and appointing him as the representative plaintiff;

(b) general damages and special damages in the amount of \$500,000,000;

(c) punitive and/or exemplary damages the amount of \$150,000,000;

(d) a reference to decide any issues not decided at the trial of the common issues;

(e) prejudgment interest compounded and post-judgment interest pursuant to the *CJA*;

(f) the costs of this action pursuant to the CPA, alternatively, on a substantial indemnity basis, plus the cost of administration and notice pursuant to s.26(9) of the CPA plus applicable taxes; and

(g) such further and other relief to this Honourable Court seems just.

NATURE OF THIS ACTION

3.

This class action concerns the life threatening, negligent and dangerous design, manufacture and installation of defective Airbag Inflators in the Vehicles subject to Transport Canada Recalls #2014559, #2014566, #2014272, #2013117, #2014476, and #2015210, and as specified below:

MAKE	MODEL	MODEL YEARS: INCLUSIVE
NISSAN	MICRA	2015
	PATHFINDER	2002 2003 2004
	SENTRA	2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
	MAXIMA	2001 2002 2003
	X-TRAIL	2004 2005 2006
INFINITI	FX35	2003
	FX45	2003
	135	2001 2002 2003
	QX4	2002 2003
	QX56	2013
	QX80	2014

4. More than 25 million vehicles worldwide, containing Takata-made Airbags, have been recalled. At least eight deaths and dozens of injuries have been linked to injuries caused by over-explosive Airbag Inflator propellant causing metal components within the device to break and project through the airbag cushion material at vehicle occupants. Takata's CEO said: "[T]he moisture absorption control of the gas generating agent in some driver seat airbags had not been correctly implemented at the time of manufacture, as a result of which an inflator canister may rupture when the airbag deploys....We deeply regret that the problem in our airbags have caused problems."

THE PLAINTIFF

5.

Jeff Mailloux is a 49 year-old police staff sergeant with the Windsor Police service, residing in the town of Bell River, in the Province of Ontario. In the spring of 2007 he purchased a 2005 Nissan XTrail. He currently owns this Vehicle.

PARTICULARS OF THE CLASS

7. The Class is comprised of all persons in Canada who owned or leased one of the Vehicles subject to the Recalls. The members of the Class are known to the Nissan Defendant.

THE DEFENDANTS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP Takata

8. Takata is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Japan. Takata describes itself as a vertically-integrated company involved in automotive safety systems. Takata was responsible for the engineering, design, development, research and manufacture of the Airbag Inflator. TK is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware. It was also responsible for the engineering, design, development, research and manufacture of the Airbag Inflator. TK is and was at all material times a wholly-owned subsidiary of Takata.

Nissan

9.

10. Nissan Canada Inc. ("Nissan") is a Canadian corporation with its head office in Mississauga, Ontario. It is involved in the engineering, design, development, research and manufacture of the Vehicles. It is a subsidiary of Nissan North America Inc. and Nissan Motor Co. Ltd.

THE DANGEROUS DEFECT IN THE AIRBAG INFLATOR

- 11. Airbags consist of three main component parts: (i) the Airbag Inflator, (ii) the airbag cushion material, and (iii) the airbag module that holds both the Inflator and cushion material in the steering wheel, dashboard, or elsewhere in the vehicle.
- 12. When the airbag is triggered to deploy, a chemical propellant, housed within the metal Airbag Inflator in the form of a solid wafer, is ignited. The heat from the ignition causes the propellant wafer to undergo a chemical reaction, which produces a gas. The inflator has a number of holes that allows the gas to exit and fill the Airbag. The holes initially are sealed, often with a thin layer of aluminum, and the force of the gas breaks the seal after the propellant is ignited, allowing for a properly timed inflation of the Airbag. Upon inflation, the Airbag is drawn out of the steering while or

dashboard. When the vehicle occupant makes contact with the Airbag, the gas is dispersed through vents located along the sides and back of the bag causing it to deflate. This whole process happens within milliseconds of a crash.

- 13. The filled airbag's purpose is to cushion the Vehicle's occupants during a crash and provide protection to their bodies when they strike interior vehicle components such as the steering wheel or a window.
- 14. An Airbag Inflator rupture occurs when there is too much pressure from the gas within the Airbag Inflator. This happens when the propellant density is too low, which causes it to burn faster and produce gas too quickly after it is ignited or when the propellant wafers crumble or break. Instead of only exiting through the inflator's designed holes, the excessive pressure of the gas ruptures the inflator's metal housing. This metal can then puncture the airbag cushion, can break into fragments, and can come into contact with vehicle occupants.
- 15. In or about 1999, Takata and TK researchers in Michigan were pressured by Takata executives to develop a more cost-effective propellant for use in its Airbag Inflators. The Takata researchers proposed a propellant based on ammonium nitrate.
- 16. The Takata engineering team in the Moses Lake, Washington plant responsible for assembling the propellant wafers into the Airbag Inflators raised objections to using a propellant based on ammonium nitrate because they understood it to be a "risky compound". The senior engineer at the propellant plant in Moses Lake, Washington, Mr. Mark Lillie, advised Takata executives that explosives manuals warned

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that the compound "tended to disintegrate on storage under widely varying temperature conditions" with "irregular ballistic" consequences.

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- 17. In or about 2000, Takata adopted ammonium nitrate as its propellant base due to its low cost, among other things, so as to remain competitive in the Airbag Inflator market.
- Since 2000, other Airbag Inflator manufacturers in North America have refused to adopt ammonium nitrate based propellants due to safety concerns.
- 19. In an interview on November 19, 2014 with the New York Times, Mr. Lillie described Takata's adoption of the ammonium nitrate based propellant in its Airbag Inflators: "It's a basic design flaw that predisposes this propellant to break apart, and therefore risk catastrophic failure in an inflator [sic]."
- 20. Takata and TK provided the Airbag Inflators to all of the recalled Vehicles as further described below.
- 21. In or about 2000, Takata and TK developed internal guidelines and specifications for the manufacturing of the new Airbag Inflators with ammonium nitrate propellant. Specifically, the ammonium nitrate propellant was to be stored in sealed containers to protect it from humidity prior to being pressed into propellant wafers. Each individual propellant wafer and propellant wafer stack was to be pressed at a specific force to ensure combustion within the Airbag Inflator was controlled. Each Airbag Inflator was to contain a stack of seven propellant wafers.

Between 2000 and 2002, when Takata and TK manufactured the Airbag Inflators at its factories in La Grange, Georgia and in Monclova, Mexico, they did not handle or produce the ammonium nitrate wafers in accordance with their own guidelines and specifications.

- 23. Production of the Airbag Inflators at the Moses Lake, Washington factory commenced on April 13, 2000. Between April 13, 2000 and September 11, 2002, this factory produced propellant wafers with an inadequate compaction force. Although the Moses Lake factory had an "auto-reject" function that could detect and reject propellant wafers with inadequate compression by monitoring the compression load that had been applied, this function was turned off manually by the machine operator in this plant. Takata thus shipped Airbag Inflators for assembly into the Vehicles which were pressed with insufficient force.
- 24. Production of the Airbag Inflators at the Monclova, Mexico factory commenced on October 4, 2001. Between October 4, 2001 and October 31, 2002, the employees at this factory produced propellant wafers that were exposed to dangerous levels of humidity. Although Takata and TK had internal specifications on the handling of the ammonium nitrate containers, the ammonium nitrate was left sitting in unsealed containers and exposed to moisture from the factory floor. These propellant wafers absorbed moisture beyond the allowable limits.
- 25. At that time, Takata and TK knew that its Monclova, Mexico factory was manufacturing Airbag Inflators with a defect rate that was "six to eight times above acceptable limits, or roughly 60 to 80 defective parts for every one million Airbag

Inflators shipped. Defective Airbag Inflators were shipped to the Manufacturer Defendants from the Monclova, Mexico factory for assembly into the Vehicles.

- 26. Takata and TK's propellant wafer lot production history records and its Airbag Inflator production records do not permit it the identification of whether all or some, or which, of the Airbag Inflators were manufactured with the previously described defects. Throughout this statement of claim, these Airbag Inflators are referred to as "Defective Airbag Inflators".
- 27. Takata and TK thus do not know which of the Vehicles assembled with Airbag Inflators manufactured at these factories during the time periods previously described are defective, and which are not defective.
- 28. The only way to ensure a vehicle does not contain a defective Airbag Inflator is to recall it and service it with an Airbag Inflator that is not defective.
- 29. The Defendants manipulated airbag test data so that the unacceptable defect rate was not discovered by the regulators or the Class Members until the Recalls.
- 30. In November 2000, TK employees prepared an internal report whereby they raised concerns about airbags defect rate manipulation. The report concludes that in several instances, "pressure vessel failures", or airbag ruptures, were reported to vehicle manufacturers as normal airbag deployments.

In 2004, a vehicle was involved in an otherwise non-catastrophic collision that caused the Airbag Inflator to deploy. It deployed abnormally, having ruptured and killed the vehicle's driver. Because of the nature of the lacerations to the driver's face, the responding police initially treated the case as a homicide. But the Los Angeles County Coroner's report concluded that the deceased driver's lacerations came from "a metallic portion" of the defective Airbag Inflator that "hit the deceased on the face as it deployed". This incident is referred to as the 2004 Los Angeles Airbag Inflator rupture.

- 32. A former TK lab employee described his review of the defective Airbag Inflator in 2004 in the Los Angeles Airbag Inflator rupture by saying that it "looked like it had exploded, and had a hole punched out of the side of the canister."
- 33. TK conducted a series of tests on 50 defective Airbag Inflators retrieved from inoperable Vehicles in junkyards to determine the cause of the 2004 Los Angeles Airbag Inflator rupture. Each of these vehicles had been assembled with the defective Airbag Inflators manufactured at the Moses Lake, Washington or the Monclova, Mexico factories during the periods described above.
- 34. The tests were conducted outside of normal business hours, during evenings and weekends at a site with restricted access. The tests revealed that two of these defective Airbag Inflators showed cracks and the start of "rapid disassembly" during the tests. "Rapid disassembly" was TK's preferred term for explosion. This is a very high failure rate in the Airbag Inflator manufacturing industry.

- 35. TK employees theorized that a problem with the welding of the Airbag Inflator's canister, intended to hold the airbag's explosives, made its structure vulnerable to splitting and rupturing. These employees were directed to design prototypes for possible fixes and a second canister to strengthen the unit was designed.
- 36. After the design of the replacement second canister, TK directed that further testing be stopped, and all lab employees involved with this testing of defective Airbag Inflators were instructed to destroy all related data, including video and computer backups. The prototypes of the prototype non-defective Airbag Inflators were also ordered to be disassembled and disposed of in a scrap-metal dumpster.
- 37. In January 2005, TK employees continued to raise concerns about the Defendants' airbag defect manipulation. In an internal email, Bob Schubert, a TK airbag engineer, alerted other TK employees that he had been "repeatedly exposed to the Japanese practice of altering data presented to the customer," adding that such conduct was described by Takata and TK as "the way we do business in Japan." Mr. Schubert described this practice as having "gone beyond all reasonable bounds and now most likely constitutes fraud."
- 38. From May to August of 2007, TK received three accident reports from another automobile manufacturer involving ruptured defective Airbag Inflators. In response, TK began collecting defective Airbag Inflators for inspection from the field, investigating the root cause of the defect.

By September 2008 the investigation undertaken by TK after August 2007 confirmed what TK already knew during 2000 - 2002: that a defect existed in the Airbag Inflators because of the inadequate manufacturing processes involving propellant wafers produced between 2000 and 2002 in its factories in Moses Lake, Washington and Monclova, Mexico.

- 40. As a result, between 2008 and 2011, other automobile manufacturers began reporting a series of safety recalls for cars equipped with defective driver Airbag Inflators, produced between 2000 and 2002. This included approximately 1.1 million vehicles in Canada and the U.S., model years ranging from 2001 to 2004.
- 41. Nissan did not report any safety recalls at this time.
- 42. Throughout this first set of recalls, Takata and TK did not know which of the Vehicles had been assembled with Airbag Inflators that were defective. During a meeting of high-level Takata and TK executives on July 22, 2009, Hidenobu Iwata, who at the time oversaw TK, pressed Takata's president, Shigehisa Takada, on the extent of the defect. The Minutes of this meeting indicate that Mr. Iwata asked Mr. Takada: "I am constantly worrying how far it spread out. I want you to stude [study] the reason quickly."
- 43. The Minutes of the July 22, 2009 meeting of high-level Takata and TK executives also identify an engineer known as "Otakaa" as also pressing Mr. Takada on the reasons for the defect: "Why does the propellant deteriorate with age? Why does it explode? I want to know the truth."

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- In 2011, Takata and TK were notified of Airbag Inflator ruptures occurring in scrapyards in Japan by salvage operations conducting "end of life" recycling processes for expired vehicles. Takata and TK launched an investigation and began testing defective Airbag Inflators taken from vehicles in the field.
- 45. By October 2012, the investigation undertaken by Takata in 2011 confirmed what it already knew in 2000 – 2002 and what TK already concluded from its investigation in September 2008: that inadequate compression of the propellant wafers and exposure to poor moisture conditions, in combination with aging of the propellant was causing the defective Airbag Inflators to rupture.
- 46. Also in 2012, Takata, TK and another automobile manufacturer commissioned a study by the High Pressure Laboratory at Pennsylvania State University, to study the use of ammonium nitrate in the airbags. The study's conclusion cast doubt on the use of ammonium nitrate, suggesting it was sensitive to changes in pressure. The findings and methodology of the study were disputed by Takata. This test was not shared with NHTSA until two years later.
- 47. By April 2013, the Takata Defendants confirmed the existence of this Airbag Inflator defect to NHTSA. This led to a second series of safety recalls for vehicles equipped with defective Airbag Inflators.
- 48. On April 11, 2013, Kazuo Higuchi, Senior Vice President of Takata wrote to NHTSA regarding "a potential defect relating to motor vehicle safety in certain air bag [sic] inflators" arising from manufacturing errors at the Moses Lake, Washington and

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Monclova, Mexico factories. Mr. Higuchi wrote that the reason for this defect was that the Airbag Inflator "could potentially deteriorate over time due to environmental factors, which could lead to over-aggressive combustion in the event of an air bag deployment. This could create excessive internal pressure within the inflator, and the body of the inflator could rupture".

49.

In this letter, Mr. Higuchi also admits that it does not know how many of its defective Airbag Inflators were installed into vehicles because it did not have those records:

TAKATA 288 16th Street, NW, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20006 USA TEL: 202-729-6332 FAX: 202-349-4034 -

April 11, 2013

Ms. Nancy Lewis: Associate Administrator of Enforcement National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Attn: Re: Recall Management Division (NVS-215) Room W48-302 1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. Washington, D.C. 20590

RE: <u>Defect Information Report, Certain Air Bag Inflators Used as</u> Original Equipment

Dear Ms. Lewis:

TK Holdings Inc. ("Takata") is submitting this Defect Information Report ("DIR") pursuant to 49 CFR 573.3(f) and 573.6(c). This DIR contains information about a potential defect relating to motor vehicle safety in certain air bag inflators used as original equipment in vehicles produced by several vehicle manufacturers.

If you have any questions about this DIR, please contact the undersigned at (202) 729-6332 or at <u>kazuo.higuchi@takata.com</u>.

Sincerely,

Kazuo Higuchi

Senior Vice President

Enclosure

DEFECT INFORMATION REPORT

1. Manufacturer's name:

TK Holdings Inc.

2. Items of Equipment Potentially Containing the Defect:

Certain air bag inflators installed in frontal passenger-side air bag modules equipped with propellant wafers manufactured at Takata' s Moses Lake, Washington plant during the period from April 13, 2000 (start of production) through September 11, 2002 (an improved quality control process was confirmed to be in place no later than September 12, 2002), and certain air bag inflators manufactured at Takata' s Monclova, Mexico plant during the period from October 4, 2001 (start of production) through October 31, 2002 (an improved quality control system for handling and storing of the propellant wafers was confirmed to be in place no later than November 1, 2002).

The inflators covered by this determination were installed as original equipment in vehicles manufactured by the following entities:

Toyota Motor Corporation Contact: Bob Waltz, Group VP Product Quality and Service Support Toyota Motor Sales, Inc. 91001 South Western Ave. Torrance CA 90501 (310) 468 9048

Honda Motor Co., Ltd. Contact: Jay Joseph American Honda Motor Co., Inc 1919 Torrance Boulevard Torrance, CA 90501-2746 (310) 783-2000

Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. Contact: Dale Weiss and James Hunter Nissan North America, Inc. 610 Enon Spring Rd. E, Smyrna, TN 37167-4410 (615) 223-3199

Mazda Motor Corporation Contact: Max Yamashita, Manager, Part Quality Assurance 26900 Hall Road Woodhaven, MI 48183 (734) 692-3681

BMW Contact: Robert Janssen Bayerische Motoren Werke AG Knorrstr. 147 80788 Munchen Germany +49 89 382-45277

General Motors Contact: M. Carmen Benavides, Director Product Investigations and Safety Regulations 30001 Van Dyke Rd. Warren Mi 48090-9020

3. Total Number of Items of Equipment Potentially Involved:

Although Takata knows the number of subject air bag inflators it supplied to each vehicle manufacturer, Takata does not know how many of the subject inflators were installed in vehicles sold in the United States. That information is available from the vehicle manufacturers.

4. Approximate Percentage of Items of Equipment Estimated to Actually Contain the Defect:

Unknown. However, based on the very small number of field incidents that have occurred, it is extremely low.

5. **Description of the defect**:

Some propellant wafers produced at Takata's plant in Moses Lake, Washington between April 13, 2000 and September 11, 2002 may have been produced with an inadequate compaction force. (Beginning in September 2001, Takata utilized an " auto-reject" ("AR") function that can detect and reject propellant wafers with inadequate compression by monitoring the compression load that had been applied. However, for the next year, that function could be turned on and off manually by the machine operator in the plant.

No later than September 12, 2002, the machine was modified by the addition of an interlock feature that precluded production of propellant wafers without the AR function in place.)

In addition, some propellant wafers used in inflators produced at Takata's plant in Monclova, Mexico between October 4, 2001 and October 31, 2002 may have been exposed to uncontrolled moisture conditions. Those wafers could have absorbed moisture beyond the allowable limits. (Production processes were revised no later than November 1, 2002 to assure proper handling and environmental protection of all in-process propellant.) . ____

In both cases, the propellant could potentially deteriorate over time due to environmental factors, which could lead to over-aggressive combustion in the event of an air bag deployment. This could create excessive internal pressure within the inflator, and the body of the inflator could rupture.

6. Chronological summary of events leading to this determination:

October 2011 -Takata was first notified of an incident related to this issue, which involved the deployment of a passenger air bag in Japan. Takata promptly began an investigation, consisting of a fault tree analysis and an analysis of production records.

November 2011 - Takata was made aware of an incident in which an air bag inflator ruptured in a U.S vehicle (in Puerto Rico).

February -June 2012 -Takata conducted replication tests on inflators taken from vehicles in the field, but could not reproduce the problem.

September -November 2012 -Takata was informed of three additional incidents in the United States (two in Puerto Rico and one in Maryland (the Maryland vehicle had previously been operated in Florida for eight years)).

October 2012 -After considering a wide range of possible causes, Takata concluded that there was a possibility that the propellant in certain propellant wafers produced at the Moses Lake, Washington plant might not have been adequately compressed. Through replication tests, Takata confirmed that the combination of an inadequately compressed propellant wafer and exposure to certain environmental conditions for an extended period could create excessive internal pressure within the inflator during a deployment, and the body of the inflator could rupture. However, Takata also discovered at this time that, beginning in September 2001, the machine that molded the propellant into wafers was equipped with an "auto-reject" CHAR") function that would identify and reject wafers with inadequate compression.

February -March 2013 -Takata discovered that, for approximately one year, the AR function could be turned on and off manually by the machine operator in the plant. Takata subsequently confirmed that an interlock feature was added no later than September 12, 2002, which precluded production of wafers unless the AR function was in place.

Takata also discovered that some propellant wafers that were used in inflators produced at its plant in Monclova, Mexico between October 4, 2001 and October 31, 2002 may have been exposed to uncontrolled moisture conditions, and that those wafers could have absorbed moisture beyond the allowable limits. Takata confirmed that the combination of excess moisture in a propellant wafer and exposure to certain environmental conditions for an extended period also could lead to an inflator rupture due to excessive internal pressure.

Takata is aware of only six such incidents involving the subject inflators in vehicles in the field (four in the United States and two in Japan). (In addition, there were six incidents that occurred in salvage yards in Japan.) Moreover, Takata is not aware of any injuries associated with the improper deployment of any air bags containing the suspect inflators. However, in view of the possibility that such a deployment could lead to an injury, on April 5, 2013, Takata decided that a defect related to motor vehicle safety exists.

7. Description of the Remedy Program:

Takata will work with the manufacturers of the vehicles in which the covered air bag inflators were installed to implement an appropriate field action.

On April 11, 2013 Nissan reported Road Safety Recall #2013117, to

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Transport Canada. A total of 55,824 Vehicles were recalled. This published Road Safety

Recalls read as follows:

Road Safety Recalls Database Transport Canada Recall # 2013117

Recall Date	2013/04/11	2013/04/11		
Notification Ty	pe Safety Mfr	Safety Mfr		
System	Airbag	Airbag		
Manufacturer R Number	ecall R1302 (Nissan), R1303	R1302 (Nissan), R1303 (Infiniti)		
Units Affected	-?J 55,824	55,824		
Category	Car, SUV	Car, SUV		
	Recall	Details		
On certain vehicle: during airbag depl fragments to be pr damage the airbag fully deploy during to the seat occupar inflator.	s, the passenger (frontal) airbag oyment. Increased pressure ma ropelled toward vehicle occupa module, which could prevent pa g a crash (where deployment is nt. Correction: Dealers will insp	g inflator could produce excessive internal pressure by cause the inflator to rupture, which could allow ants, increasing the risk of injury. This could also roper deployment. Failure of the passenger airbag to warranted) could increase the risk of personal injury pect and, if necessary, replace the passenger airbag		
Make	Make Model Model Year(s) Affected			
	FX35 2003			
INFINITI	FX45 2003			
	135	2001 2002 2003		
-	QX4	2002 2003		

	MAXIMA	2001 2002 2003
NISSAN	PATHFINDER	2002 2003
	SENTRA	2002 2003

On July 2, 2014, Nissan reported Road Safety Recall #2014272, to Transport Canada. A total of 76,236 Vehicles were recalled. This was said to supersede the #2013117 Recall, though not all the same model years were included. The updated Road Safety Recall reads as follows:

Road Safety Recalls Database

51.

Transport Canada Recall # 2014272

Recall Date	2014/07/02	
Notification Type	Safety Mfr	
System	Airbag	
Manufacturer Recall Number	R1302 (Nissan), I	R1303 (Infiniti)
Units Affected ك	76,236	
Category	Car, SUV	
	Recall Details	
On certain vehicles, the passenger (f pressure during airbag deployment. In could allow fragments to be propelled This could also damage the airbag mo- the passenger airbag to fully deploy increase the risk of personal injury to t necessary, replace the passenger airbag Vehicles corrected as part of the previou	rontal) airbag inflator co icreased pressure may cau I toward vehicle occupant dule, which could prevent during a crash (where of he seat occupant. Correct inflator. Note: This rec us campaign will require re	buld produce excessive internal se the inflator to rupture, which is, increasing the risk of injury. a proper deployment. Failure of deployment is warranted) could ion: Dealers will inspect and, if all supersedes recall 2013117*. e-inspection and/or repair.
Make	Model	Model Year(s) Affected
INFINITI	FX35	2003
	FX45	2003
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		·

QX4 2002 2003
MAXIMA 2002 2003
THFINDER 2002 2003
SENTRA 2002 2003 2004
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52. On October 23, 2014, Nissan reported Road Safety Recalls #2014476, to Transport Canada. A total of 45 Vehicles were recalled. This published Road Safety Recall reads as follows:

Road Safety Recalls Database

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Transport Canada Recall # 2014476

Recall Date	2014/	10/23
Notification Ty	pe Safety	Mfr
System	Airba	3
Manufacturer Recall	Number	
Units Affected	<u>?</u> , 45	
Category	SUV	
Recall Details		
On certain vehicles, the driver's (frontal) airbag inflator was built with an incorrect part which could cause the inflator to rupture during a deployment. In a crash, this may cause airbag components to separate, which could allow fragments to be propelled toward vehicle occupants, increasing the risk of injury. Correction: Dealers will replace the driver's (frontal) airbag.		
Make	Model	Model Year(s) Affected
INFINITI	QX56	2013

•			
	OX80	2014	
	2		

- 53. On November 24, 2014, the Takata Defendants announced that the chemical composition of the propellant which had been used in the Airbag Inflators manufactured at the Moses Lake, Washington and Monclova, Mexico factories was being changed for the production of the Airbag Inflators which would be used for servicing the recalled Vehicles.
- 54. On December 10, 2014, Nissan reported Road Safety Recalls #2014559, to
 Transport Canada. A total of 259 Vehicles were recalled. These published Road Safety
 Recall reads as follows:

Road Safety Recalls Database

Transport Canada Recall # 2014559

Recall Date	2014/12/10	
Notification Type	Safety Mfr	
System	Airbag	
Manufacturer Recall Number		
Units Affected 🖓	259	
Category	Car	
Recall Details		
On certain vehicles, the driver's (frontal) airbag inflator was built with an incorrect part which could cause the inflator to rupture during a deployment. In a crash, this may cause airbag components to separate, which could allow fragments to be propelled toward vehicle occupants, increasing the risk of injury. Correction: Dealers will replace the driver's (frontal) airbag inflator.		
Make	Model Year(s) Affected	

- 24 -

NISSAN	MICRA	2015

On December 12, 2014, Nissan reported Road Safety Recalls #2014566, to Transport Canada. A total of 13, 750 Vehicles were recalled. This published Road Safety Recall reads as follows:

Transport Canada Recall # 2014566

Recall Date	2014/12/12	
Notification Type	Safety Mfr	
System	Airbag	
Manufacturer Recall Number		
Units Affected 🖓	13,750	
Category Car, SUV		
Recall Details		
On certain vehicles, the passenger (frontal) airbag inflator could produce excessive internal		

On certain vehicles, the passenger (frontal) airbag inflator could produce excessive internal pressure during airbag deployment. Increased pressure may cause the inflator to rupture, which could allow fragments to be propelled toward vehicle occupants, increasing the risk of injury. This could also damage the airbag module, which could prevent proper deployment. Failure of the passenger airbag to fully deploy during a crash (where deployment is warranted) could increase the risk of personal injury to the seat occupant. Correction: Dealers will inspect and, if necessary, replace the passenger airbag inflator. Note: This is an expansion of recalls 2013117 and 2014272. Vehicles that were repaired under the previous campaign are not affected because that remedy would have corrected the subject condition.

Make	Model	Model Year(s) Affected
NISSAN	PATHFINDER	2003 2004
NISSAN	SENTRA	2004
NISSAN	X-TRAIL	2005

On December 18, 2014, Takata took out a full-page advertisement in various major nation U.S. newspapers, apologizing for the Airbag Defect and the resulting crisis. The "Open Letter from Takata Corporation", reads in part, as follows:

"Even one failure is unacceptable and we are truly and deeply saddened that five fatalities have been attributed to auto accidents where Takata air bags malfunctioned [...] We understand the public's concerns and we take them seriously."

57. In February 2015, NHTSA fined Takata \$14,000 per day for not cooperating fulling with the agency's investigation into the airbag defect.

58. On May 15, 2015, Nissan reported Road Safety Recalls #2015210, to Transport Canada. A total of 62,538 Vehicles were recalled. This published Road Safety Recall reads as follows:

Recall Date	2015/05/15
Notification Type	Safety Mfr
System	Airbag
Manufacturer Recall Number	
Units Affected 🖓	62,538
Category	Car, SUV
<u> </u>	Recall Details
On certain vehicles, the passenger pressure during airbag deployment.	(frontal) airbag inflator could produce excessive internal Increased pressure may cause the inflator to rupture, which led toward vehicle occupants, increasing the risk of injury

Road Safety Recalls Database Transport Canada Recall # 2015210

56.

On certain vehicles, the passenger (frontal) airbag inflator could produce excessive internal pressure during airbag deployment. Increased pressure may cause the inflator to rupture, which could allow fragments to be propelled toward vehicle occupants, increasing the risk of injury. This could also damage the airbag module, which could prevent proper deployment. Failure of the passenger airbag to fully deploy during a crash (where deployment is warranted) could increase the risk of personal injury to the seat occupant. Correction: Dealers will inspect and, if necessary,

replace the passenger airbag infla	te the passenger airbag inflator. Note: This is an expansion of recalls 2013117 and 2014566.		
Make	Model	Model Year(s) Affected	
	PATHFINDER	2002 2003	
NISSAN	SENTRA	2002 2003 2004	
	X-TRAIL	2004 2005 2006	

59. In all of the above recalls, Nissan explains that both the driver's side and passenger-side frontal airbag inflators are defective, such that they could produce excessive internal pressuring during deployment, which pressure may cause the inflator to rupture and which could increase the risk of injury to vehicle occupants.

NEGLIGENCE

- 60. The Defendants, at all material times, owned a duty of care to the Plaintiff and Class Members to provide a product that did not have a design defect. The Vehicles pose a serious risk of injury and death to the Plaintiff and Class Members on account of the Airbag Inflator Defect.
- 61. The Defendants, as the designers, engineers, manufactures, comanufacturers, promoters, marketers and distributors of the Vehicles and their component parts, intended for use by ordinary consumers, owed a duty of care to the Plaintiff and Class Members to ensure that the Vehicles and their component parts were reasonably safe for use.

- Takata and TK's use of ammonium nitrate in its Airbags, when Takata knew that ammonium nitrate was not in use by comparable airbag manufacturers and that it was subject to instability, was a design defect and constitutes a breach of the standard of care. Takata knew that a safer and economically feasible alternative was available, and was in fact being used by other comparable manufacturers in their airbag inflator products, but Takata chose not to use such an alternative.
- At all material times, the Defendants owned a duty of care to the Plaintiff
 and Class Members, and breached the standard of care expected in the circumstances.
 Once aware of the Airbag defect, the Defendants had a duty to warn Class Members of
 the risks associated with use of the Vehicles.
- 64. The Defendants also owed the Plaintiff and other Class Members a duty to carefully monitor the safety and post-market performance of the airbags in the Vehicles. The Defendants had a duty to warn the Plaintiff and Class Members of danger associated with the use of the Vehicles. They failed in their duty to have those Vehicles recalled from the Canadian market upon discovering the defect which could cause serious personal injury and death, in conditions of ordinary use and which otherwise reduced the value of the Vehicles and resulted in costs associated with the loss of use of the Vehicles.
- 65. The circumstances of the Defendants being in the business of designing, manufacturing and placing the Vehicles and their component parts into the Canadian stream of commerce are such that all the Defendants were in a position of legal proximity to the Class Members, and therefore under an obligation to be fully aware of their safety

when designing, manufacturing, assembling and selling a product such as the Airbags in the Vehicles.

66. It was reasonably foreseeable that a failure by the Defendants to design and manufacture reasonably safe airbags, and thereafter to monitor the performance of such airbags following market introduction (and to take corrective measures when required) would cause harm to the Plaintiff and Class Members.

67. Through their employees, officers, directors and agents, the Defendants failed

to meet the reasonable standard of conduct (care) expected in the circumstances in that:

(a) they wrongfully and intentionally accepted the foreseeable risk of injury and loss of life and property damage to the drivers, passengers and the public because of the Airbag Inflator defect;

(b) notwithstanding that they foresaw personal injuries and the loss of life and property of the drivers and passengers in the Vehicles, the Defendants failed to eliminate or correct the Airbag Inflator defect in a timely manner, or at all;

(c) the Airbag Inflator defect was known by Takata and TK in 2000, but they did not advise Transport Canada or the public in a timely manner or at all;

(d) the Airbag Inflator defect was known or ought to have been known to Nissan as early as 2008 (when other vehicle manufactures began recalling their vehicles for safety issues relating to airbags) but they did not come forward to Transport Canada and initiate recalls until 2014 in the case of Transport Canada Recalls #2014559, #2014566, #2014272, #2013117 and #2014476 and May 2015 in the case of Transport Canada Recall #2015210;

(e) the Defendants knew or ought to have known about the Airbag Inflator defect and should have announced it to the public;

(f) the Defendants designed, developed, tested, manufactured, assembled, distributed and sold a defective Airbag Inflator;

(g) the Defendants failed to warn the drivers, passengers and the public about the defective Airbag Inflators until April 2013 in the case of Transport Canada Recall #2013117, July 2, 2014 in the case of Transport Canada Recall #2014272, October 23, 2014, in the case of Transport Canada Recall #2014476, December 10, 2014 in the case of Transport Canada Recall #2014559, December 12, 2014, in the case of Transport Canada Recall #2014566 and May 15, 2015, in the case of Transport Canada Recall# 2015210;

(h) Takata and TK failed to change the design, manufacture and assembly of the Airbag Inflator in a reasonable and timely manner;

(i) the Defendants failed to properly test the Airbag Inflator;

(j) Takata and TK failed to establish any, or any adequate, procedures to ensure that the design of the Airbag Inflator was appropriate;

(k) the Defendants failed to establish any, or any adequate, procedures for evaluating the design defects of the Airbag Inflator;

(1) the Defendants failed to properly instruct their employees to evaluate the injuries, deaths and accidents involving the Airbag Inflator and its excessive internal pressure during deployment;

(m) the Defendants failed to review and evaluate the accidents and complaints about the Airbag Inflator and excessive internal pressure during deployment;

(n) the Defendants failed to initiate timely review, evaluation and investigation of the Airbag Inflator and the excessive internal pressure following complaints, injuries and deaths if a malfunction occurred;

(o) Takata and TK knew or ought to have known about the defect in the Airbag Inflator in 2000 but they kept this defect a secret;

(p) Takata and TK failed to review, evaluate, and maintain all records of written and oral complaints relative to the reliability, safety, effectiveness and performance of the Airbag Inflator;

(q) the Defendants failed to implement a safety recall until April 2013 in the case of Transport Canada Recall #2013117, July 2, 2014 in the case of Transport Canada Recall #2014272, October 23, 2014, in the case of Transport Canada

Recall #2014476, December 10, 2014 in the case of Transport Canada Recall #2014559, December 12, 2014, in the case of Transport Canada Recall#2014566 and May 15, 2015, in the case of Transport Canada Recall# 2015210;

(r) the Defendants failed to disclose to the owners and drivers of the Vehicles and to the public that, in some crashes, airbags did not fully deploy because the Airbag Inflator could rupture;

(s) the Defendants knew or ought have known that the Vehicles suffered from this design defect in the Airbag Inflator;

(t) the Defendants failed to conform with good manufacturing practices;

(u) the Defendants hired incompetent personnel;

(v) the Defendants failed to properly supervise their employees;

(w) the Defendants failed to train their employees in proper documentation process;

(x) the Defendants failed to encourage discussion of safety issues, including discussion of defects and safety consequences of defects;

(y) the Defendants knew or ought to have known from reports to them, that there was an excessive internal pressure and risk of safety to the drivers, passengers and the public;

(z) the Defendants failed to report this dangerous Airbag Inflator defect to the owners and drivers of the Vehicles and to the public;

(aa) the Defendants failed to protect the Class Members and the public;

(bb) the Defendants failed to make full, frank and complete disclosure to the regulators, the public, their customers and the Class Members;

(cc) the Defendants failed to institute a proper risk/management system;

(dd) the Defendants failed to advise the owners and drivers of the Vehicles, until April 2013 in the case of Transport Canada Recall #2013117, July 2, 2014 in the case of Transport Canada Recall #2014272, October 23, 2014, in the case of Transport Canada Recall #2014476, December 10, 2014 in the case of Transport Canada Recall #2014559, December 12, 2014, in the case of Transport Canada Recall #2014566 and May 15, 2015, in the case of Transport Canada Recall #2015210, that they should have their vehicles inspected to replace the Airbag Inflator;

(ee) the Defendants failed, until April 2013 in the case of Transport Canada Recall #2013117, July 2, 2014 in the case of Transport Canada Recall #2014272, October 23, 2014, in the case of Transport Canada Recall #2014476, December 10, 2014 in the case of Transport Canada Recall #2014559, December 12, 2014, in the case of Transport Canada Recall#2014566 and May 15, 2015, in the case of Transport Canada Recall#2015210, to adequately warn owners and drivers of the Vehicles that there was a serious risk of injury associated with the Vehicles; and

(ff) the Defendants failed to exercise reasonable care and judgment.

REGULATORY INVESTIGATION

- 68. On November 7 2014, U.S. lawmakers asked the U.S. Justice Department to open a criminal investigation into the Takata Defendants' destruction of the test results of the 50 defective Airbag Inflators in 2004, as previously described.
- 69. On November 13, 2014, a U.S. federal grand jury commenced the criminal investigation by subpoenaing the Takata Defendants for documents relating to the destruction of the test results of the 50 Airbag Inflators in 2004. The U.S. Justice Department's criminal investigation is ongoing.
- 70. On November 21, 2014, the Japanese Transport Ministry ordered Takata to conduct an internal investigation into the defective Airbag Inflators and comprehensively explain their defect. Takata's internal investigation is ongoing.

On or about December 3, 2014, during a United States Congress subcommittee hearing in Washington, D.C., Takata Senior Vice President Hiroshi Shimizu rejected NHTSA's demand for a nationwide recall, claiming there was "not enough scientific evidence" to expand the recall.

72. In May of 2015, NHTSA released a statement that Takata had acknowledged that the airbag inflators it produces are defective. The NHTSA statement also announced that NHTSA was in the process of issuing a Consent Order to TK, which requires, among other things, the company to cooperate in future regulatory actions.

73. On November 2, 2015, TK entered into two consent orders issued by NHTSA for a \$200 million civil penalty, the largest NHTSA has ever imposed. The consent orders also dealt with the following admissions by TK and findings by NHTSA:

(a) TK in several instances provided NTHSA with selective, incomplete and inaccurate information relating to NHTSA's inflator investigation;

(b) TK in several instances supplied its customers (vehicle manufacturers) with selective, incomplete and inaccurate data about its inflators;

(c) TK used recalled inflators as interim replacement parts to other recalled inflators;

(d) TK 's initial root cause theories of production issues at its Monclova, Mexico and Moses Lake, Washington, even if correct, do not account for the ongoing issues with inflator rupture;

(e) TK has been unable to determine the root cause of inflator ruptures despite its decade-long investigation; and

(f) TK has agreed to phase out production of phase-stabilized ammonium nitrate-based propellants because NTHSA lacks "confidence in the long-term performance of such inflators".

74. In part to address and appease NHTSA, and because Transport Canada does not have the same ability as its American counterpart to investigate and fine a vehicle or vehicle part manufacturer, Takata and TK have prioritized the manufacturing and distribution of replacement airbag inflators for affected vehicles in the United States, over the vehicles driven by the Class Members in Canada.

ADMISSIONS BY TAKATA CEO

- 75. Shigehisa Takata is Takata Japan's Chairman and CEO. On November 13, 2014, Mr. Takata apologized to the U.S. and Canadian customers, the Class Members and the public for this dangerous Airbag Inflator safety defect. He admitted that: "[T]he moisture absorption control of the gas generating agent in some driver seat airbags had not been correctly implemented at the time of manufacture, as a result of which an inflator canister may rupture when the airbag deploys....We deeply regret that the problem in our airbags have caused problems."
- 76. On December 1, 2014, Mr. Takata also apologized for the loss of life caused by the Airbag Inflators: "Takata deeply regrets the injuries and fatalities that have occurred in accidents involving ruptured airbag inflators."
- 77. Mr. Takata's statements are an admission that the Takata Defendants were in breach of the standard of conduct (care) in manufacturing the Airbag Inflators. They are

also an admission of a breach of the standard of conduct (care) in the safety aspects to the drivers and passengers in the Vehicles to the public in Canada and the U.S. and to the regulators in Canada and the U.S.

GENERAL AND SPECIAL DAMAGES

78.

As a result of the negligence of the Defendants, particularly the dangerous defects in the Airbag Inflator in the Vehicles, the failure of the Defendants to disclose this safety defect to the Plaintiff and Class Members until the Recalls, the Class has suffered, damages. These damages include but are not limited to the following:

(a) the value of each of the Vehicles is reduced;

(b) the Class Members overpaid for the Vehicles and/or did not get what they bargained for;

(c) each Class Member must expend the time to have his/her Vehicle repaired and be without their motor vehicle (from the time they drop their Vehicles off at authorized repair shops/dealers, to when they pick them up again). The Defendants should compensate each Class Member for their losses and inconvenience;

(d) some Class Members have incurred out of pocket expenses for, among other things, alternative transportation and prior repairs to the Airbag Inflator; and

(e) some Class Members have experienced personal injuries as a result of the Airbag Inflator Defect, and are entitled to recovery of damages relating thereto.

79. The Class Members are unable to have their Airbag Inflator repaired immediately because the Defendants do not have the parts and service capability to repair their Vehicles. The Class Members must drive a dangerous Vehicle. They are entitled to

have the Defendants supply a replacement vehicle or a "courtesy car" until Nissan fixes the Airbag Inflators at no cost to the Class Members as a matter of course, and not only at the request and effort of the Class Members.

- 80. The Class Members have driven their Vehicles less than they otherwise would due to fear of personal injury. Some of the Class Members have taken taxis, used public transportation or imposed on friends, family and others. The Class Members have incurred expenses.
- 81. The Plaintiff pleads that the Class Members' damages were sustained in Ontario and in the rest of Canada.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES

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82. The Defendants' conduct described above was arrogant, high-handed, outrageous, reckless, wanton, entirely without care, deliberate, secretive, callous, willful, disgraceful, in contemptuous disregard of the Class' rights and intentionally disregarded the interests of the Class Members and the public. For such abhorrent conduct and motivated by economic consideration, the Defendants are liable to pay punitive and aggravated damages.

THE RELEVANT STATUTES

83. The Plaintiff pleads and relies upon the provisions of the CPA, CJA and the Motor Vehicle Safety Act.

PLACE OF TRIAL

84. The Plaintiff proposes that this action be tried in the City of Toronto, Province of Ontario.

SERVICE

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> 85. This originating process may be served without court order outside Ontario in that the claim is:

> > (a) in respect of a tort committed in Ontario (rule 17.02(g)); and

(b) against a person ordinarily resident or carrying on business in Ontario; (rule 17.02(p)).

March 29, 2016

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